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In much of the existing literature on compliments it is assumed that the hearer interprets an 
utterance as a compliment either because he recognises a formula that is conventionalised to a 
certain extent or because he recognises that a conversational maxim has been violated. The aim 
of this paper will be to offer an alternative approach to the interpretation of compliments in the 
light of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995). It will be argued that compliments 
are utterances used interpretively and, more exactly, that they can be echoic utterances that 
convey an attitude of acceptance or endorsement.  
 
An overview of compliments 
According to Searle (1976), compliments are expressive speech acts because their 
propositional content specifies a reaction of the speaker to a situation in which the hearer takes an 
active or passive part. The majority of authors who have dealt with compliments have underlined 
that their function is to establish, increase or consolidate solidarity bonds between interlocutors 
(Chen 1993; Herbert 1989, 1990; Jaworski 1995; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1989; Manes and 
Wolfson 1981; Wolfson and Manes 1980; Wolfson 1983). Thus, Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 
states that “They are typically performed to make the addressee feel good by saying something 
nice to him/her, in this way possibly satisfying the addressee’s expectations rather than 
expressing a position judgement for a referential or informative reason [...]” (1989: 75). They are 
social lubricants that create or maintain rapport because they normally refer to something 
positively valued by participants and attributed to the hearer (Holmes and Brown 1987; Wolfson 
1981). Their topics tend to be general and relate to things such as appearance, abilities, skills, 
possessions, personality or friendship (Herbert 1991; Holmes and Brown 1987). Nevertheless, 
there is cross-cultural variation as far as topic is concerned and topics-selection depends on the 
different underlying set of values of sociocultural groups (Herbert 1991; Manes 1983). 
However, there has also been much confusion in the literature on compliments. Thus, 
Pomerantz (1978: 107) used terms such as compliments, praise or credit to name them. Herbert 
(1991: 383), Jaworski (1995: 73-74) and Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1989: 79) note that 
individuals have difficulty when distinguishing between a compliment and a praise, so they 
suggest considering praises as a wider category within which compliments should be included. In 
a similar vein, Norrick (1980: 297) also mentioned that compliments can be confused with 
congratulations, so he proposed that the difference between these two acts is that compliments 
reflect a personal and subjective judgement, whereas congratulation show a more objective 
judgement that can be shared by more than one person. 
The structure of a compliment speech act is that of an adjacency pair in which there is a 
first turn of initiation, the compliment, and a second turn that responds to it, the compliment 
response. Manes and Wolfson have shown in several works (e.g. Manes and Wolfson 1981; 
Wolfson 1981, 1983; Wolfson and Manes 1980) that most compliments are realised by means of 
a limited set of very predictable semantic-syntactic structures. This led these authors to conclude 
that compliments can be considered formulae whose interpretation would be relatively 
straightforward and would not involve much difficulty or effort for hearers. As Herbert puts it, 
“The noncreativity of the compliment act is a striking fact: these are speech formulae. It is 
tempting to speculate that such noncreativity is directly tied to a need for easily recognizable 
formulae in status- and solidarity-negotiating gambits in speech. That is, in making a social move 
of this kind, the use of a formula decreases the likelihood that the move might be misinterpreted 
or unnoticed by an addressee” (1991: 390). 
According to Manes and Wolfson, there are three very commonly used semantic-syntactic 
structures for the realisation of compliments (1-3), although other six minor patterns can also be 
appreciated (4-9)1: 
 
(1) NP [is/looks] (really) ADJ: That blouse is really nice! 
(2) I (really) [like/love] NP: I love your cakes! 
(3) PRO is (really) (a) ADJ NP: This was a great dinner! 
(4) You V (a) ADJ NP: You did a great job. 
(5) You V NP (really) ADV: You sang that song really well. 
(6) You have (a) (really) ADJ NP: You have a beautiful leaving room. 
(7) What (a) ADJ NP: What a pretty skirt! 
(8) ADJ NP: Good shot! 
(9) Isn’t NP ADJ! : Isn’t that ring pretty! 
 
These patterns can be considered, in Herbert (1991: 383) or Jaworski’s (1995: 64) terms, 
direct or explicit realisations of compliments. In addition to them, Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 
(1989: 81) has also illustrated that there are other direct formulae for compliments that can be 
said to have been conventionalised. These formulae resort to stylistic figures, such as metonymy 
(10), similes and metaphors (11), synecdoche (12), rhetorical questions (13), litote (14), 
hyperbole (15) or humour (16): 
 
(10) You’ve got some brains, haven’t you? 
(11) You are a Paul Newman. 
(12) All the angels are demons. 
(13) Isn’t she pretty? 
(14) She’s got something, some charm. 
(15) Wonderful, marvellous, magnificent! 
(16) For your age, you still look like a boy. 
 
As with other speech acts, it must be pointed out that the realisation of compliments is also 
subject to cross-cultural variation. Thus, Herbert (1991: 391) observes that there are remarkable 
differences between English and Polish speakers in the focus of the compliment, i.e. the basic 
semantic-syntactic structure, so it is necessary to differentiate compliments with focus on the first 
person, on the second person or on the third person. Nelson, El Bakary and Al Batal (1996: 114) 
have also shown that Arabic speakers use in some cases very conventionalised metaphors and 
similes, whereas in others these are very innovative and elaborated. In a similar way, these 
authors have mentioned that these speakers quite frequently use proverbs as compliments or 
enlarge their compliments by adding or repeating adjectives to express their feelings, so that “[...] 
the more the repetition, the better the compliment” (Nelson et al. 1996: 123). 
Apart from these conventionalised formulae, Herbert (1991: 381), Jaworski (1995: 64) or 
Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1989: 77) have explained that it should be convenient to consider 
other realisations of compliments by means of semantic-syntactic structures that are not so 
conventional or predictable, which can increase the feeling of spontaneity and sincerity of the 
compliment. These realisations are indirect, for “[...] [their] value is implied rather that stated 
directly in the utterance [...]” (Jaworski 1995: 64), and involve a greater degree of indirectness 
and ambiguity, which results in an increase of hearer’s processing effort, since he will have to 
carry out more inferences to recover the message the speaker intended to convey (Lewandowska-
Tomaszczyk 1989: 77).  
On the one hand, Boyle (2000: 35) suggests that there are two main types of indirect or 
implicit compliments: those in which the speaker mentions an achievement of the hearer (17) and 
those in which the speaker compares the hearer to another person (18): 
 
(17) You’ve worked with Elisabeth Taylor! (Boyle 2000: 36) 
(18) There’s something Karen Carpenterish about your voice on this album. (Boyle 
2000: 41) 
 
On the other hand, Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1989: 83-84) distinguishes the following 
indirect realisations of compliments, in which the compliment is realised by other speech act: 
a) By means of a complaint: 
(19) It’s a pity so few people watched your performance. 
b) Quoting an opinion different from the speaker’s: 
(20) The reviews are more than favourable. (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1989: 83) 
c) By means of supposition: 
(21) You must be a brain box! 
d) Violating conventional expectations, increasing, thus, hearer’s surprise about some 
undetermined aspect: 
(22) I thought that your house was big, but it is bigger. 
e) Using indefinite phrases: 
(23) Who’s playing that relaxing music? 
f) Asking the speaker’s opinion or advice: 
(24) I would really appreciate your opinion – how does it taste? 
g) Comparing the speaker with the hearer: 
(25) Gee, I’d never have done it! 
h) Setting contrasts between hearer and other individuals: 
(26) I’ve never seen anybody with such a nice haircut! 
i) Asking a question that presupposes something favourable for the hearer: 
(27) That sweater, did you knit it yourself? (Conveyed message: I know you can knit 
and that sweater looks extremely good! Either you bought it at a very expensive 
shop or you are really gifted. I am sure the latter is true). (Lewandowska-
Tomaszczyk 1989: 84) 
j) Setting contrast with the past: 
(28) Well, now it’s so different! Thank God, things have changed! 
k) Reducing the amount of verbal stimuli because of the occurrence of enough contextual 
and paralinguistic elements in the situation: 
(29) a. Your hair! 
 b. Wow! 
 c. The jumper! 
 
One of the problems of the current studies in pragmatics mentioned so far about 
compliments is that they do not offer any accurate explanation of how and why a hearer interpret 
an utterance as a compliment. According to their authors, hearers would interpret a specific 
utterance as a compliment because they recognise the formula used. These studies rely heavily on 
the classifications that have been established for compliment behaviour, which reflect the 
regularities observed in the realisations of this speech act. This would imply that those 
classifications should be revised and reformulated every time a new regularity is perceived. 
Furthermore, some of these studies propose that hearers interpret an utterance as a compliment as 
a result of their understanding that a conversational maxim has been violated, an explanation that 
has been traditionally given since Grice (1975) proposed his Co-operative Principle. 
The aim of this paper is to give an account of compliments in the light of Relevance Theory 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995). According to this theory, no classification is needed and no 
maxim violation is postulated, but a single general principle grounded on a description of human 
cognition. Therefore, in what follows, I am going to introduce very briefly some of the basic 
postulates of this theory, paying special attention to its distinction between descriptive and 
interpretive dimensions of language use. When dealing with the case of interpretive utterances, I 
will focus on the case of echoic utterances, which will be fundamental for the understanding of 
the proposal outlined in this paper. Finally, I will suggest how both direct and indirect 
compliments can be interpreted. 
 
Relevance Theory 
Basic postulates of Relevance Theory 
Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995) is based on a definition of relevance and 
two general principles. On the one hand there is a cognitive principle of relevance, which states 
that human cognition is geared to the maximisation of relevance. On the other hand, a 
communicative principle of relevance, according to which every utterance communicates a 
presumption of its own optimal relevance, i.e. it creates expectations of relevance.  
Relevance is treated as a property of utterances and is defined in terms of contextual effects 
and processing effort. Contextual effects result from the processing of new information in a 
context of assumptions selected from the whole set thereof. They can be of three types: 
strengthening of previously held assumptions; contradiction of assumptions, which can result 
into the deletion of possessed information; or contextual implications, which is the new 
information derived only from the union of old and newly received information. The processing 
of new information requires some mental effort. This effort comes from the construction or 
selection of a context of assumptions in which to process information or from the psychological 
complexity of utterances. Other things being equal, the more contextual effects the processing of 
an utterance produces, the more relevant it will be; and the more cognitive effort required to 
process it, the less relevant it will be. Therefore, the optimal relevance of an utterance lies on an 
adequate balance between processing effort and contextual effects. 
Every utterance attracts the addressee’s attention towards a set of assumptions the speaker 
wants to make manifest, some of which are essential for a correct understanding of her utterance. 
Those assumptions can be communicated either explicitly or implicitly. In some circumstances 
the addressee can determine the set of implicit assumptions in a very exact way because the 
speaker has made strongly manifest that she expects him to use them to process her utterance. 
However, in others the addressee has to run the risk of determining it, since some of those 
assumptions are only weakly manifest2. This might lead him to use assumptions the speaker 
might not have intended him to use, so that the responsibility of understanding an utterance in a 
particular way lies heavily on the addressee’s selection of a context for interpretation. 
 
Descriptive and interpretive dimensions of language use 
Within the framework or Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995) a very 
important distinction is that between descriptive and interpretive dimensions of language use. In 
appropriate conditions, any natural or artificial phenomenon in the world can be used as a 
representation of some other phenomenon that it resembles in some respects. Utterances can be 
used as representations, not in virtue of resembling some phenomenon, but in virtue of having a 
propositional form that is true of some actual or conceivable state of affairs. Since utterances are 
also phenomena, they can be used to represent something they resemble. In this case, Sperber and 
Wilson (1986/1995: 228) argue that the representation is a description, or that it is used 
descriptively. 
In addition to this, utterances can represent some other representation that has also a 
propositional form in virtue of a resemblance between the two propositional forms. In this second 
case, Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 228) state that the first representation is an interpretation 
of the second one, or that it is used interpretively. Moreover, Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 
230) suggest that there is a more essential interpretive use of utterances, since every utterance can 
be used to represent a thought of the speaker’s. One of the assumptions a speaker intends to make 
manifest to the hearer is that she is entertaining some thought with some particular attitude, and 
on this ground the hearer may be led to entertain a similar thought with a similar attitude. 
Therefore, verbal communication involves a speaker producing an utterance as a public 
interpretation of one of her thoughts and a hearer constructing a mental interpretation of her 
utterance, and hence of the original thought of the speaker’s. An utterance is an interpretive 
expression of a thought of the speaker’s, on the basis of which the hearer makes an interpretive 
assumption about the speaker’s informative intention. But when an utterance is used 
interpretively, it can also be an interpretation of some attributed thought or utterance, or it can be 
an interpretation of some thought that is or would be desirable to entertain in a certain way. 
 
Echoic utterances 
As has been said, interpretive utterances can be interpretations of a thought of someone 
other than the speaker. These utterances are second-degree interpretations of someone else’s 
thoughts. An utterance used as an interpretation of someone else’s thought is always an 
interpretation of the speaker’s understanding of that person’s thought. These utterances achieve 
relevance by informing the hearer of the fact that the speaker has said something or thinks 
something similar to that other person. In other cases, these interpretations achieve relevance by 
informing the hearer of the fact that the speaker has in mind what that person said and has a 
certain attitude to it. When interpretations achieve relevance in this way, Sperber and Wilson 
(1986/1995: 232) say that they are echoic. 
The most frequently mentioned example of echoic utterances is irony. It echoes the thought 
of a certain person, or of people in general. The attitude expressed by it is invariably of the 
rejecting or disapproving kind. The speaker dissociates himself from the opinion echoed and 
indicates the she does not hold it herself. The recovery of these implicatures depends, first, on a 
recognition of the utterance as echoic; second, on an identification of the source of the opinion 
echoed; and third, on a recognition that the speaker’s attitude to the opinion echoed is one of 
rejection or dissociation. What is important is that a speaker can use an echoic utterance to 
convey a whole array of attitudes and emotions, ranging from outright acceptance and 
endorsement to outright rejection and dissociation. The recognition of these attitudes and 
emotions may be crucial to the interpretation process. 
Nonetheless, Hamamoto (1998) and Seto (1998) have pointed out that it is necessary to 
take into account that the source or the immediate antecedent of many echoic utterances may not 
be straightforwardly identified in many circumstances. Hamamoto (1998) also notes that in some 
circumstances echoic utterances resemble an echoed proposition and also describe a state of 
affairs at the same time. 
 
A Relevance-Theoretic oriented account of compliments 
As aforementioned, the aim of this paper is to offer an explanation of how and why hearers 
can understand an utterance as a compliment following Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 
1986/1995). According to this theory, no classification of compliments is needed and no maxim 
violation is postulated. What is needed is a single general principle for utterance interpretation. 
Firstly, it must be said that in many cases an utterance intended by the speaker to be 
recognised as a compliment is not actually interpreted as such by the hearer, but as a mere 
description of a state of affairs. This is so because the propositional form of that utterance is true 
of some state of affairs that is strongly manifest in both interlocutors’ mutual cognitive 
environment. Or, in other words, because the hearer thinks that utterance is merely used to 
represent something in the real world it resembles, i.e. because he thinks that the speaker is using 
it descriptively. Thus, all the above examples, except (7), (9) and (13), can be interpreted as 
descriptive utterances about something that is strongly manifest in the interlocutors’ mutual 
cognitive environment.  
To illustrate this more clearly, if a speaker utters (1) while seeing a blouse in a shop 
window, the hearer may think that the propositional form of that utterance is just a description of 
the blouse they are seeing in the shop. In the same way, if the speaker says (1) when meeting the 
hearer, who happens to be wearing a blouse, he may also think that the utterance is only a 
description of the blouse. In appropriate contexts, for instance, a hearer may regard (3) as a 
description of the dinner, and (5) as a description of his performance. Therefore, for an utterance 
to be understood as a compliment it does not only have to be a representation of the real world, 
but of something else. 
In my opinion, for an utterance to be understood as a compliment, it must be a 
representation of some other representation that has a propositional form. This means that for an 
utterance to be understood as a compliment it must be used interpretively. As interpretive 
utterances, compliments can be said to be interpretations of a thought or opinion of the speaker. 
They achieve relevance by informing the hearer of the fact that the speaker has said or thinks 
something that resembles her thoughts, as well as by conveying an attitude to it. The attitude 
conveyed by the speaker of a compliment, as opposed to irony, must be one of endorsement and 
acceptance of the proposition expressed. 
Thus, in a situation in which two individuals are greeting each other and one of them utters 
(1), for the hearer to understand that utterance as a compliment, it will have to be manifest to him 
that the speaker is interpreting her own thoughts or an opinion of hers and, at the same time, that 
she does indeed believe that the blouse the hearer is wearing is really nice. Similarly, in a context 
in which an individual has sung a beautiful tune, (5) can be interpreted as a compliment if it is 
manifest to the hearer that the utterance is an interpretation of the speaker’s opinion about the 
hearer’s performance and if it is manifest to him that she endorses the proposition conveyed by 
means of that utterance. Finally, to conclude this brief exemplification, for (8) to be understood 
as a compliment, it must be manifest to the hearer that that utterance is an interpretation of the 
speaker’s own opinion about the shot and that she accepts and endorses that opinion. Therefore, 
for an utterance to be understood as a compliment, the speaker must be seen as conveying an 
interpretation of her thoughts or opinions and an attitude of endorsement or acceptance of them.  
But compliments can also be interpretations of a thought or opinion of the individual to 
whom they are addressed; i.e., they can also be echoic utterances. In this case, they may display 
the speaker’s understanding of the hearer’s thoughts, so they achieve relevance by informing the 
hearer of the fact that the speaker has said or thinks something that is similar to his thoughts or 
opinions and, in addition, has an attitude to it that is of endorsement or acceptance. Therefore, the 
previous examples can also be interpreted as only interpretive utterances, if it is strongly manifest 
that those utterances only interpret the speaker’s thoughts, or as echoic utterances, if it is strongly 
manifest that the speaker is making an interpretation of the thoughts or opinions of the person to 
whom the compliment is being addressed. In both cases, the relevance of the compliment lies on 
the fact that the speaker has informed the hearer about this and on the fact that she has an attitude 
of endorsement or acceptance of the proposition expressed. 
Imagine an individual has refurbished his living room because it looked a little bit old-
fashioned and has therefore spent a lot of money to make it more beautiful. One day he invites a 
good friend of his to see the new aspect of his living room. This friend knows perfectly well his 
taste and his idea of what a beautiful living room might look like. Therefore, in such a situation, 
if this friend of his says (6), this individual may interpret that utterance as a compliment if it is 
strongly manifest that his friend is showing him her understanding or her interpretation of what 
she thinks his thoughts or opinion about the living room are. In other words, (6) may be 
interpreted as a compliment if it achieves relevance by informing the individual that the speaker 
has said or thinks something similar to his thoughts or opinions about the beauty of his living 
room and that the speaker also endorses or accepts those thoughts or opinions about the living 
room. This means that (6) may be understood as a compliment if it achieves relevance by 
informing the hearer that the speaker is echoing his thoughts or opinions about the living room 
and endorsing or accepting them at the same time. 
Suppose now that an individual has done a great job and he is aware of it. Another person 
has seen him and thinks more or less the same about the way in which he did the job. If she utters 
(4), the individual may understand it as a compliment if it achieves relevance by informing him 
that the speaker has said or thinks something similar to what he thinks about his job and, in 
addition, that the speaker endorses or accepts those similar thoughts or opinions about the way in 
which the job has been done. In this context, (4) may be understood as a compliment if the hearer 
understands that the speaker is echoing his thoughts or opinions about the job and endorsing or 
accepting them. 
Nevertheless, it is not always clear that in all the possible situations the speaker is echoing 
the thought or opinions of the hearer. This implies that in some situations there is no easily 
recognisable source of the echo or no immediate antecedent of the echo (Hamamoto 1998; Seto 
1998). However, according to Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995), it must be remembered that any 
intentional stimulus or behaviour alters the participants’ mutual cognitive environment by 
making mutually manifest to them a set of assumptions. Thus, in situations in which an 
individual has a new appearance (e.g. 1, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 26, 27, 29), performs in a certain 
way an action (e.g. 2, 8, 15, 19, 23, 24, 27), accomplishes something (e.g. 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 15, 20, 
21, 22, 25, 28), etc. that behaviour makes mutually manifest to both participants a certain set of 
assumptions. In those situations, it is that set of assumptions made mutually manifest to both 
speaker and hearer that can be the source of the echo. Therefore, compliments may also echo 
assumptions strongly manifest in the interlocutors’ mutual cognitive environment. They achieve 
relevance by informing the hearer about the speaker’s particular interpretation of those 
assumptions and by conveying her attitude of endorsement or acceptance of the proposition 
expressed. 
Imagine a woman wearing a new blouse enters a room where her husband is. This will 
make mutually manifest to both of them assumptions about the blouse that neither of them might 
have entertained before. In that specific situation, if the husband utters (1), he will be echoing that 
set of assumptions made mutually manifest and his utterance will be interpreted as a compliment. 
His utterance will then achieve relevance by informing his wife that he has a particular 
interpretation of those assumptions made mutually manifest by her wearing a new blouse and by 
conveying his attitude of endorsement or acceptance of the proposition expressed about the 
blouse. 
Similarly, in a situation in which an individual has performed a part in a play and very few 
people watched it, that event will make mutually manifest to him and his interlocutor a set of 
assumptions about the quality of his performance or about what people have missed because of 
its quality. In that context, if his interlocutor says (19) she will be echoing that set of assumptions 
mutually manifest in their cognitive environment and her utterance will achieve relevance 
because it informs the hearer that she has a particular interpretation of those assumptions about 
the performance and about what people have missed and by transmitting her attitude of 
endorsement and acceptance of the proposition she expresses. 
Finally, in the case of indirect compliments (17-29) it can be assumed that the interpretation 
of those utterances as compliments will result either from the hearer’s understanding that they are 
being used interpretively or echoically, or from the mere fact that they are indirect speech acts. 
As indirect speech acts, they involve an increase of the hearer’s processing effort, which must be 
offset by his recovery of additional contextual effects. In this case, the hearer is entitled to 
construct or retrieve from his memory as many implicated premises as necessary to achieve an 
interpretation of those utterances that is consistent with the principle of relevance. By doing so, 
he will recover the implicated conclusions of those utterances; i.e. those implicatures that the 
speaker might have expected him to derive because she intended to make her utterance 
manifestly relevant to him. Some of those implicated assumptions will be more manifest to him 
than others, depending on the level of mutual manifestness of the speaker’s informative intention. 
The lower their level of mutual manifestness, the more weakly those assumptions are 
communicated.  
Therefore, in the interpretation of indirect compliments, the hearer has to use a set of 
implicated assumptions, some of which will be strongly communicated by the speaker, whereas 
others will be recovered on his own responsibility and at his own risk. This will allow him to 
recover an interpretation of the utterance that is consistent with the principle of relevance. This 
means that he may or may not recover an interpretation of those utterances as compliments 
depending on the set of assumptions he uses as premises. But this also involves that the hearer 
can recover a wider array of weak implicatures that can even lead him to recover an unintended 
interpretation of the utterance. 
 
Conclusion 
In synthesis, compliments can be understood as such if they are recognised to be 
interpretive or echoic utterances. What is important for the hearer in understanding them is to 
recognise that the speaker can be interpreting some of her own thoughts, some thoughts or 
opinions she attributes to him or some assumptions strongly manifest in the mutual cognitive 
environment they share. But the speaker must also be conveying at the same time her attitude of 
endorsement. Therefore, we do not need any classification of commonly used semantic-syntactic 
patterns for some types utterances to be interpreted as compliments, nor do we need to think that 
a conversational maxim is being violated. What we need is a single general principle about 
human cognition and an understanding of three possible ways in which utterances can achieve 
relevance. 
 
Notes 
1 See Wolfson and Manes (1980) and Manes and Wolfson (1981) for a more detailed presentation 
of the most usual verbs, adjectives and adverbs in compliments. Herbert (1990) also discusses 
sex-based differences in compliment behaviour; Holmes and Brown (1987) mention the social 
factors influencing it, mainly age and status, and Valdés and Pino (1981) analyse the different 
patterns used among intimates and non-intimates. 
2This is the basis for Sperber and Wilson’s (1986/1995) distinction between strong and weak 
communication. 
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